IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ZIMBABWE

 

                                                                                                      Case No:   SC 16/05 

 

In the matter between:

 

ROY LESLIE BENNETT                                                                                    Applicant

 

and

 

EMMERSON DAMBUDZO MNANGAGWA

In his capacity as the Speaker of the

PARLIAMENT OF ZIMBABWE                                                           First Respondent

 

PAUL MANGWANA                                                                        Second Respondent

 

JOYCE MUJURU                                                                                 Third Respondent

 

CHIEF MANGWENDE                                                                      Fourth  Respondent

 

WELSHMAN NCUBE                                                                           Fifth Respondent

 

TENDAI BITI                                                                                          Sixth Respondent

 

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL                                                                           Intervener

 

 

 

 

______________________________________________________________________

 

APPLICANT’S HEADS OF ARGUMENT

______________________________________________________________________

 

INTRODUCTION

 

1.             This matter concerns the constitutional validity of

 

1.1.                the proceedings in terms of which the applicant was convicted by Parliament and sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment arising from a decision by the majority of Parliament that one of its members, the applicant, was guilty of contempt.  The majority of Parliament thereupon sentenced the applicant to 15 months’ imprisonment with hard labour, three months of which were suspended subject to certain conditions;

 

1.2.                the provisions of the Privileges, Immunities and Powers of Parliament Act (“the Act”) in terms of which those proceedings purported to take place.

 

 

SCHEME OF THESE SUBMISSIONS

 

2.             In these submissions,

 

2.1.                first we set out the background to the matter;

 

2.2.                we then address (in Part I) each of the three grounds for review that we advance, namely:

 

2.2.1.       the composition and attitude of the Parliamentary Privileges Committee vitiate its decision because they give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias and interest in the cause, alternatively a violation of the fundamental right of the applicant not to be discriminated against by virtue of his race and political affiliation,

 

2.2.2.       the actions and attitude of Parliament itself vitiate its decision because they give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias and the breach of the requirements of natural justice, alternatively a violation of the fundamental right of the appellant not to be discriminated against by virtue of his race and political affiliation and

 

2.2.3.       the sentence imposed was grossly unreasonable and disproportionate and amounts to cruel and inhuman punishment as contemplated by section.

 

2.3.                finally (in Part II) we address the applicant’s constitutional challenge to the Act itself.  We address this last as a matter of convenience, because it is desirable first to analyse the essential facts of the matter, which in turn immediately give rise to the three review grounds.

 

BACKGROUND

 

3.             The applicant was elected as the Member of Parliament for the Chimanimani constituency in the 2000 parliamentary elections.  He is a member of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), the official opposition in the Parliament of Zimbabwe. 

 

Bennett founding affidavit, p. 5, para 4.1.

 

4.             On 18 May 2004 an incident took place in Parliament.   The Attorney-General, a member of Parliament of Zanu (PF), Mr P. Chinamasa, engaged in a verbal attack on the applicant and his ancestors, including accusing them of being criminals. The applicant responded by pushing Mr Chinamasa.

 

Bennett founding affidavit, p. 11, para 7.1.

 

5.             Thereafter a Committee was set up under the Privileges, Immunities and Powers of Parliament Act Chapter 2:08 (“the Committee”) to look into the incident.

 

Bennett founding affidavit, p. 12, para 8.

 

6.             On 26 October 2004, a report of the Committee was tabled in Parliament. The Committee found the applicant guilty of contempt of Parliament and the three-person majority of the committee supported a penalty of imprisonment with labour for fifteen months with three months suspended.  The remaining two members of the Committee voted against the custodial sentence.

 

Bennett founding affidavit, p. 13, para 10

Annexure B to Bennett founding affidavit - Report of the Parliamentary Privileges Committee, pp. 40, 42 and 43.

 

7.             On 28 October 2004, Parliament voted along party lines to adopt the majority recommendation of the Parliamentary Privileges Committee.

 

Bennett founding affidavit, p. 13, para 10.

 

 

 

PART I:          THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1^ST TO 6^TH RESPONDENTS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH SECTIONS 15, 18 AND 23 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE

 

8.             It is clear that Parliament must at all times act in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, including when it considers whether one of its members is guilty of contempt.  As this Court stated in Mutasa v Makombe 1998 (1) SA 397 (ZS) at 401H:

“Is it open to argument that, in one or other of the respects complained of by the appellant, the privileges and powers enjoyed by Parliament were exercised in conflict with the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution? That is the crux of the matter.”

 

Similarly, this Court has stated, with reference to the Powers, Immunities and Privileges Act (“the PIPP Act”), that:

“When construing the provisions of Chap 10 the Courts of justice cannot ignore any breaches of fundamental rights in order to rule in favour of Parliamentary privilege. To do so would be inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution.”

Smith v Mutasa and Another NNO 1990 (3) SA 756 (ZS) at 762J-763A.

 

9.             This Court is required to intervene if Parliament, in dealing with an accusation of contempt, violates the rights of one of its members.

“[W]here the Court can and must interfere is where Parliament has improperly exercised that privilege and has acted mala fide or capriciously and in defiance of the constitutionally inherent rights of a Member - such as the right to just administrative action.”

De Lille and Another v Speaker of the National Assembly 1998 (3) SA 430 (C) at para 34 (and see Speaker of the National Assembly v De Lille 1999 (4) SA 863 (SCA) at 868I-869B).

 

10.        The applicant’s case is that when the Committee and Parliament found him guilty and sentenced him, they did so in violation of his constitutional rights.  In particular:

 

10.1.           The composition and proceedings of the Committee and Parliament were not in accordance with the principles of natural justice and did not amount to the required fair hearing before an impartial tribunal.  This is a violation of section 18(1), (2) and (9) read with section 13(1) and (2)(b) of the Constitution.

 

10.2.           The actions taken against the Applicant constitute discrimination on the grounds of race and political opinion given that no action was taken against other members of Parliament who engaged in misconduct at the same time, and therefore violate section 23(1)(b) and (2) of the Constitution.

 

10.3.           The sentence imposed by the Committee and Parliament  constitutes, in the circumstances of the matter, inhuman and degrading punishment and therefore violates section 15(1) of the Constitution.

 

11.        We address each of these submissions in turn.

 

(1)     THE COMPOSITION AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE AND PARLIAMENT WERE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE AND DID NOT AMOUNT TO THE REQUIRED FAIR HEARING BEFORE AN IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL.

 

The constitutional requirement of a fair procedure in accordance with natural justice

 

 

12.        The right to a fair hearing in accordance with natural justice is well-entrenched in Zimbabwean law.  As this Court has made clear:

“It is settled law that where a statute empowers a public official or body to give a decision which will prejudicially affect an individual in his liberty, property or existing rights, the right to a fair hearing is to be given effect to unless the statute expressly or by implication indicates the contrary.”

Holland and Others v Minister of the Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, Zimbabwe 1998 (1) SA 389 (ZS) at 393I-394B.

 

13.        This requirement, which exists at common law, is further entrenched by section 18 of the Constitution.  This section provides, in relevant part, as follows:

“(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, every person is entitled to the protection of the law.

(2)  If any person is charged with a criminal offence, then, unless the charge is withdrawn, the case shall be afforded a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial court established by law.

. . .

(9)  Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, every person is entitled to be afforded a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial court or other adjudicating authority established by law in the determination of the existence or extent of his civil rights or obligations.”

 

14.        On face value, this section would seem to require that the circumstances of the present case demand that the applicant be accorded a fair hearing. 

 

14.1.           Section 22 of the PIPP Act read with the Schedule to the Act makes it clear that the contempt which the applicant has been convicted is a criminal offence.  He therefore meets the requirement for facing a “criminal offence” and as such is constitutionally entitled to a “fair hearing” under section 18(2).

 

14.2.           Even if, for some reason, the Applicant did not fall within section 18(2), he would fall within section 18(9) in that the “existence or extent of his civil rights and obligations” is at issue.  This Court has already made clear that the term “civil rights and obligations” is “of wide import”, that “its ambit is not easily defined” and that it includes a “prejudicial effect on property and liberty . . . of the aggrieved person”.

Holland (supra) at 392E-H.

 

Thus the applicant would be constitutionally entitled to a “fair hearing” by virtue of section 18(9) of the Constitution.

 

15.        It must be recognised immediately that Gubbay CJ in Mutasa (supra) suggested that section 18(2) and (9) of the Constitution did not apply when Parliament found a member guilty of contempt.  Whether this approach was correct is, with respect, open to significant doubt.  However, for purposes of this case, it is not necessary to decide whether Mutasa was correctly decided.

 

16.        This is because Mutasa did not involve the deprivation of liberty – it involved a suspension from Parliament. In contrast, the present case involves a severe deprivation of liberty – a sentence of fifteen months in jail (three months suspended).

 

17.        Because the present case involves the deprivation of liberty, section 18 of the Constitution must be read in the light of the guarantee of individual liberty, which is contained in section 13 of the Constitution.  Whatever the correctness of the decision in Mutasa, we submit that any deprivation of liberty may take place only as a consequence of a procedurally fair hearing in accordance with natural justice.  The matter must therefore be approached differently to Mutasa.  Indeed, in his decision, Gubbay CJ recognised that the circumstances of a particular case of contempt could nevertheless produce a violation of constitutional rights:

“Of course, in Zimbabwe . . . [contempt] jurisdiction must be exercised in a manner not inconsistent with or offensive to the Declaration of Rights in the Constitution. For instance, the courts would not tolerate a situation in which the Speaker decreed that a member guilty of a contempt was to stand before the House chained and gagged to receive his punishment.”

       Mutasa at 403D.

 

 

18.         Moreover, Mutasa is additionally distinguishable on the grounds that the applicant in that matter expressly abandoned his allegations of bias on the part of the committee which enquired into his contempt  (see Mutasa at 404A).   Had these allegations been persisted in, and found as a fact by the court, the logical corollary would have been that the proceedings were nullified, because bias (or the reasonable perception of bias) in law has that effect (per Corbett CJ in Council of Review, SADF v Monnig 1992 (3) SA 482 (A) at 495B-D). In this regard, moreover, it is inconceivable that the Constitution could countenance the deprivation of liberty through a process which did not meet the requirements of natural justice.  By way of comparison, the South African Constitutional Court has held that freedom has two inter-related constitutional aspects:

“the State may not deprive its citizens of liberty for reasons that are not acceptable, nor, when it deprives its citizens of freedom for acceptable reasons, may it do so in a manner which is procedurally unfair.”

De Lange v Smuts NO and Others 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) at para 18

S v Coetzee and Others 1997 (3) SA 527 (CC) at para 159.

 

Crucially, this holding of the Constitutional Court was sustained under both the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions, despite the fact that neither section which protected liberty expressly referred to the notion of procedural fairness.  The Court described the right to procedural fairness as being “implicit” in the constitutional guarantee of freedom.

“[T]he requirement of 'fairness' or 'due process' or 'natural justice' . . . however one wishes to label it, is implicit in this right.”

Nel v Le Roux NO and Others 1996 (3) SA 562 (CC) at para 12. 

 

See also De Lange (supra) at para 22.

 

19.        An analysis of section 13 of the Zimbabwean Constitution further strengthens this conclusion.  Section 13 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

“(1) No person shall be deprived of his personal liberty save as may be authorized by law in any of the cases specified in subsection (2).

(2)  The cases referred to in subsection (1) are where a person is deprived of his personal liberty as may be authorized by law-

       . . .

(b)       in execution of the order of a court punishing him for contempt of that court or of another court or tribunal or in execution of the order of Parliament punishing him for a contempt”

(emphasis added).

 

20.        Sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 13 thus refer to a deprivation of liberty only being applicable when it is “authorised by law”.   It is not “authorised by law” when it is vitiated by bias and thus in law a nullity.  To sustain a deprivation of liberty in such circumstances is to flout the principle of legality (or “rule of law” in more traditional terms) which is the linchpin of the constitutional state (Fedsure Life Ass Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) at para [58]). That government must comply with the “rule of law” is further made clear by section 18(1) of the Constitution which provides:

“Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, every person is entitled to the protection of the law.”

 

21.        Arguments concerning the procedural requirements for a deprivation of liberty and the implications of section 13 were, of course, not considered at all in Mutasa’s case because that case did not raise the deprivation of liberty.  We submit that when these issues are considered, it is clear that Parliament was constitutionally required to adopt a fair procedure in accordance with natural justice when it deprived the Applicant of his liberty. Certainly it could not adopt a procedure which in law gives rise to a nullity; that could never be “authorised by law”.

 

22.        We now turn to the requirements that must be met for a hearing to be procedurally fair and in accordance with natural justice.

 

The requirements that must be met for a hearing to be procedurally fair and in accordance with natural justice

 

23.        This Court has made clear procedural fairness “varies according to context” and that its “breadth must be determined from the specific nature of the proceedings or inquiry in question”.  It is submitted that where a deprivation of liberty is being sought, the requirements to be met will be more exacting than in other contexts.  In any event, this Court has already set out the minimum requirements for procedural fairness:

“At the very least there are three fundamental requirements of natural justice to which a person directly affected by an impending inquiry is entitled: The first is the right to have notice of the charge or complaint. The second is the right to be heard - to be given the opportunity to adequately state a case in answer to that charge or complaint. And the third, mentioned expressly in s 18(9), is the right to an impartial hearing.”  

Holland (supra) at 393D-F (emphasis added.)

 

24.        It is this third requirement, the right to an impartial hearing, on which the applicant primarily relies.  In a number of respects, the Committee and Parliament manifestly did not afford the applicant an impartial hearing:

 

24.1.           A majority of the Committee members were from the majority party, meaning that it was biased, or at the very least reasonably perceived as biased against the applicant.  A reasonable perception of bias, of course, suffices to invalidate.

 

24.2.           Parliament convicted and sentenced the applicant by voting on party lines, meaning that it was biased against the applicant.

 

24.3.           The majority party was the complainant in this matter and yet controlled the charging, investigating, conviction and sentencing processes.

 

24.4.           The members of the majority party who sentenced and convicted the applicant had a direct and substantial interest in the matter.

 

25.        In each of these respects, the Committee and/or Parliament breached the applicant’s right to a fair hearing.

 

The composition of the Committee

 

26.        The Committee played a critical role in the determination of the applicant’s guilt and his consequent sentence.  Its report formed the basis of Parliament’s decision and its proposals were fully adopted by Parliament.

 

27.        Therefore, in order for Parliament’s decision to comply with requirements of administrative justice, it is not only Parliament that must abide by the principles of natural justice and absence of bias, but also the Committee. 

 

28.        This is demonstrated by the case of De Lille (supra) which involved similar factual circumstances.  The South African Parliament appointed an ad hoc committee to investigate one of its members, Ms De Lille, for contempt. The committee made recommendations to Parliament, including punishment to be meted out, and Parliament then adopted these recommendations.  Ms De Lille challenged the decisions of the ad hoc committee and Parliament.

 

29.        In dealing with this case, the Court was faced with an argument that the ad hoc committee investigating Ms De Lille merely made recommendations to Parliament and therefore did not have to accord comply with the requirement of natural justice.  Hlophe J rejected this argument:

“The ad hoc committee's investigation and subsequent recommendations led to a decision seriously affecting individual rights and interests. . . . Lord Loreburn LC quite rightly considered a fair hearing to be 'a duty lying upon everyone who decides anything'. Surely the exercise by a body of a disciplinary power over one of its members is an obvious case in which fairness requires that the rules of natural justice should be complied with. It follows therefore that whatever the source of power that was exercised by the    Assembly to suspend the first applicant it had to be done in accordance with the dictates of fairness and natural justice.”

 De Lille (supra) at para 15.

See also Re Pergamon Press [1970] 3 All ER 535 (CA).

 

30.        The Committee consisted of five members. The applicant alleges that a majority of the Committee were members of ZANU-PF.  Similarly, an annexure to the affidavit of the sixth respondent indicates that three of the Committee members were members of ZANU-PF or, at the very least, strong supporters of ZANU-PF.

Bennett Founding Affidavit, p. 13, para 10 and p. 14, para 12.1.

Annexure A to Biti Affidavit, p. 63, para 3.

 

The response of the first to fourth respondents is a plainly bare denial. This cannot raise a genuine dispute of fact with the applicant’s version.

Mnangagwa Affidavit, p. 52, paras 13 and 15.

 

31.        We submit that the enquiry into the attitude and performance of the Committee must therefore proceed on the basis that a majority of the Committee members were members or strong supporters of ZANU-PF, the applicant’s political opponents.

 

32.        For a hearing to be impartial, the tribunal conducting the hearing must not be biased.  The test for bias has been set out by this Court in Bailey v Health Professions Council 1993 (2) ZLR 17 (S).  The Court held, relying on the decision in R v Gough [1993] 2 All ER 724 (HL), that:

"In that matter, the test for bias was set out with persuasive clarity in the  H  speech of Lord Goff . . .

'Accordingly, having ascertained the relevant circumstances, the court should ask itself whether, having regard to those circumstances, there was a real danger of bias on the part of the relevant member of the Tribunal in question, B  in the sense that he might unfairly regard (or have unfairly regarded) with favour, or disfavour, the case of a party to the issue under consideration by him.'

He stressed that by 'real danger' he meant a real possibility rather than a real probability of bias."

(at 22D-F)

 

33.        In Austin & Another v Chairman, Detainees' Review Tribunal & Another 1988 (1) ZLR 21 (SC) at 45-6, this Court emphasised that the test for bias is an objective one, involving an assessment of how right-minded people would perceive the proceedings in question. It is worth quoting this Court’s dictum in detail:

“When considering whether there was bias it is the impression left upon the detainees by the manner the Tribunal conducted its proceedings that is  H  important. If right-minded people entertain the likelihood of bias or believe that the Tribunal favoured unfairly one party and not the other, then its  A  decision should not be sustained. Lord Denning MR said in Metropolitan Properties Co (FGC) Ltd v Lannon & Ors . . .

‘. . . in considering whether  D  there was a real likelihood of bias, the court does not look at the mind of the justice himself or at the mind of the chairman of the tribunal, or whoever it may be, who sits in a judicial capacity. It does not look to see if there was a real likelihood that he would, or did, in fact favour one side at the expense of the other. The court looks at the impression which would be given to other people. Even if he was as impartial as could be,  E  nevertheless, if right-minded persons would think that, in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, then he should not sit. And if he does sit, his decision cannot stand.’”

 

This approach is followed in Swaziland (Minister of Justice v Sapire 10 June 2002, appeal 49/2001, unrep., at p 9), South Africa (President of the RSA v SARFU 1999 (4) SA 147 (CC) at 177), Lesotho (Sole v Cullinan [2004] 1 LRC 550 (CA) at 560-561), and the United Kingdom (Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Limited [2000] 3 LRC 482 (CA)).

 

34.        It is submitted that for a majority of any disciplinary committee to be political opponents of the accused in itself creates significant concerns regarding bias.  Where the charges in the disciplinary committee relate to a highly-charged and emotive set of events that grew out of a political dispute, we submit that any right-minded person would conclude that there was a real likelihood of bias against the accused person.

 

35.        This was recognised by the South African High Court in De Lille’s case (supra).  In that case, Ms De Lille (an opposition member of Parliament) faced an ad hoc committee where the majority (8 out of 15 members) were from the majority ANC majority party and the Committee Chairman was also from the majority party.

 

36.        Hlophe J (now JP) cited the common law rule of natural justice – the nemo iudex in sua causa rule. He explained that

“This rule requires that an affected party must be heard by an impartial and unbiased tribunal. For purposes of the rule there should not be a reasonable suspicion that the ad hoc committee was biased.”

De Lille (supra) at para 16.

 

37.        On the facts of that case, which are of course strikingly similar to those of the present case, Hlophe J accepted the argument advanced to him that:

“The ad hoc committee was not and could not be an independent and impartial forum . . . it was dominated by the majority party. Its independence or impartiality was significantly compromised.” 

De Lille (supra) at para 36.

 

38.        We therefore submit that the composition of the Committee gives rise to a real possibility of actual bias, and at the very least a real possibility of perceived bias. This in itself is sufficient to find that the recommendations of the Committee and consequently also the Parliamentary resolution which adopted these recommendations were adopted in breach of the constitutional requirement that the applicant be given a fair hearing by an impartial tribunal.

 

39.        Further evidence of bias is that a member of the Committee, Chief Mangwende, is stated to have made it clear at the beginning of the Committee’s proceedings that the issue at hand was obvious and that he was at a  loss as to why the Committee was to spend hours hearing evidence and submissions.  In the words of another committee member, Chief Mangwende’s “mind had already been made up”.

Annexure A to Biti Affidavit, p. 63, para 3(c).

 

40.        It is clear that this prevents the Committee being sufficiently impartial as it means that Chief Mangwende was not open to persuasion on the evidence and submissions as to the applicant’s guilt or the sentence to be given.  As Hlophe J held in De Lille’s case (supra):

“No one can fairly decide a case before him if he has already prejudged it. Thus prejudgment of the issues to be decided (which is in a sense prejudice) constitutes bias. The entire proceedings become tainted with bias. The reason is self-evident: ‘Justice must be rooted in confidence; and confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking: ‘the Judge was biased’.’”

De Lille (supra) at para 17.

 

41.        Apart from bare denials, virtually the only response that the first to fourth respondents have is to claim that the Committee must have been impartial and could not have been biased because it was “unanimous” on the applicant’s guilt.

Mnangagwa Affidavit, p. 51, para 11(b) and p. 52, para 13.

 

42.        We submit that this approach is fatally flawed and is no answer to the applicant’s allegations of a lack of impartiality.  This is so for two reasons.

 

42.1.           Firstly, in the context of questions of judicial impartiality, the South African Constitutional Court has held that if one of its 11 members were to incorrectly refuse to recuse himself, that decision could fatally contaminate the ultimate decision of the whole Court.

President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others 1999 (4) SA 147 (CC) at para 32-3.

 

It was the same principle that led to a decision of the House of Lords being set aside where one of its five members should have recused himself for having an interest in the decision.

R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) [1999] 1 All ER 577 (HL).

 

Crucially, this principle applies irrespective of the degree of unanimity that the multi-judge bench achieves.  Therefore, in the present case, where not just one member but a full majority of the Committee was perceived to be biased, this fatally contaminates the decision of the Committee as a whole.  This is irrespective of the degree of unanimity that is achieved.

 

42.2.           Secondly, to the extent that the unanimity of the Committee is relevant at all, it must be noted that (at best for the first to fourth respondents) the Committee was unanimous only as to the finding of the applicant’s guilt.  The Committee was split with regards to sentence with the three Zanu (PF) members voting in favour of a prison sentence of 15 months and the two MDC members voting in favour against any custodial sentence being imposed.

Annexure B to Bennett Founding Affidavit - Report of the Parliamentary Privileges Committee, pp. 41-2.

Annexure A to Biti Affidavit, pp. 63-65, paras 3-5.

 

Given this, given the fact that the applicant contends that the biased nature of the Committee affected his sentencing and that this is one of his grounds that the Committee’s decision was unconstitutional, the alleged unanimity on guilt can therefore have no bearing on this application.

 

43.        On the grounds set out above, we therefore submit that the proceedings and recommendations of the Privileges Committee were biased and irregular. They did not provide the applicant with the required impartial tribunal and the applicant’s constitutional right to a fair hearing was accordingly breached.  Both the recommendations of the Committee and the of those recommendations by Parliament should be set aside by this Court.

 

(2)       IRREGULARITIES BY PARLIAMENT ITSELF

 

The manner in which Parliament convicted and sentenced the applicant

 

44.        While the Committee made the recommendations concerning the conviction and sentence of the applicant, it was of course Parliament that had to make the final decision on both issues.  Parliament was therefore constitut