Zim Online
Sat
6 May 2006
HARARE - Zimbabwe state security agents stepped up the
use of torture
against civilians with 19 cases of torture reported in the
month of March
alone against only three cases recorded the previous two
months, the
Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum (ZHRF) said this week.
Torture is outlawed in Zimbabwe and the Harare government has in the
past
denied reports by the ZHRF, churches and pro-democracy groups that its
army
and police routinely commit torture against perceived opposition
supporters.
"The month of March saw a rise in the incidents of
torture," said the
Forum, in a report on political violence in the month of
March that was
released earlier this week but made available to ZimOnline on
Friday.
The ZHRF, which brings together 17 of the biggest human
rights groups
in the country, said in addition to rising torture there were
also several
cases of assault and unlawful arrest of citizens committed by
state secret
service agents and security forces while carrying out their
duties.
"The Forum further urges all government
officials to adhere to
international norms on torture, stipulated under the
Convention Against
Torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
or punishment,"
said the Forum.
The Forum records cases of
human rights violations in Zimbabwe which
it compiles into reports. But the
rights body says its reports do not
capture all cases of human rights abuses
in the troubled southern African
country.
The forum said 46
people were unlawfully arrested in March by police
or agents of the state's
spy Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) to
bring to a cumulative total
of 366 such illegal arrests since the beginning
of the year.
A
further 32 people were illegally assaulted in the month under review
and
again mostly by state agents to bring the cumulative total of such
assaults
since January to 71, the ZHRF said.
Detailing one case of gross
human rights abuse which it described as
"unprecedented" the Forum said a
group of Zimbabwe National Army soldiers
and Zimbabwe Revenue Authority
officials in March raided a hotel in the
eastern border city of Mutare and
heavily assaulted and tortured workers at
the hotel after accusing them of
hoarding sugar and maize-meal.
"The employees were forced to 'stand
on their heads' and to do
press-ups on their knuckles while the security
agents continued to assault
them. One of the victims John Saungweme, who is
elderly, fainted during the
ordeal," the Forum report reads in
part.
The Forum also deplored the arrest and torture of three
opposition
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party activists, three
ex-policemen and
private arms dealer, Peter Hitschmann over allegations they
had plotted to
kill President Robert Mugabe during his 82nd birthday
celebrations held in
Mutare.
The MDC activists have since been
released for lack of evidence while
Hitschmann remains in custody but now
faces charges of illegal possession of
weapons because the state could not
make the treason charge stick.
Political violence and human rights
abuses have become routine in
Zimbabwe since the emergence of the MDC in
1999 to become the biggest threat
ever to Mugabe and his ruling ZANU PF
party's decades-old grip on power. -
ZimOnline
Zim Online
Sat 6
May 2006
HARARE - Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU)
president
Washington Katema on Thursday criticized President Robert Mugabe's
government for plundering the country's economic resources and impoverishing
students.
Katema was addressing delegates to the ZINASU
congress at Mandel
Training Centre in Harare. ZINASU is the largest union of
university and
tertiary students in the country.
"What one
observes in Zimbabwe is an 'artificial government' - a
government by
deception, run by a phalanx of degreed bandits. They are not
only out of
touch with the people but perennially locked into combat, "
Katema
said.
ZINASU is a fierce critic of President Robert Mugabe's
government.
Students at universities and colleges in Zimbabwe have been
historically
critical of Mugabe's style of governance accusing the veteran
Zimbabwean
leader of ruining the country's once strong economy.
The students union also threatened to confront the government for
failing to
address the concerns of the people particularly after last
month's 1 000
percent hike in tuition fees. Katema said Mugabe's ruling ZANU
PF party of
abusing power to entrench personal interests.
"ZANU PF nationalists
did not dismantle the authoritarian colonial
state but have continued to
misuse the powers of the state to achieve
personal ends. Gradually, a state
emerged that has been hijacked by vampire
elites, hustlers and gangsters
who operated a notorious ethic of
self-aggrandisement," he
said.
Zimbabwe's education system, lauded as one of the best in the
early
1980s, has virtually collapsed after years of under-funding and
government
mismanagement of the sector. Thousands of teachers have fled the
country, in
its sixth year of a bitter economic recession, to seek better
opportunities
elsewhere. - ZimOnline
Zim Online
Sat 6 May
2006
BULAWAYO - About 120 women who were arrested on Thursday for
protesting against the increase in school fees were still in police custody
last night amid fears that the police were keen to detain them over the
weekend.
A spokesperson of the Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA)
pressure group,
Anne Sibanda, told ZimOnline last night that the women were
still in police
but had released about 73 children who had been arrested
during the protest.
"The 120 women are still in police custody but
our lawyers are still
trying to get them released and if possible we would
want them to be taken
to court as a matter of urgency," she
said.
Sibanda said the police had indicated that the women were
likely to be
charged under the Miscellaneous Offences Act for "conduct
likely to cause
breach of peace."
The women together with the
school children were arrested on Thursday
for demonstrating against last
month's 1 000 percent increase in school
fees. They also demanded that the
government allow school children who have
not paid their fees to attend
classes.
The protest group has staged a number of demonstrations in
the past
over rising cost of living in Zimbabwe which they blame on
repression and
bad economic policies by President Robert Mugabe's
government. - ZimOnline
Mail and Guardian
Harare, Zimbabwe
05 May 2006
01:19
A Cabinet minister in Zimbabwe has categorically denied
the
government is inviting white farmers dispossessed during the
controversial
land reform campaign back to their farms, it was reported here
on Friday.
"No white farmer is being invited back," State
Security Minister
Didymus Mutasa told the privately-owned Zimbabwe
Independent newspaper.
The minister, one of the most senior
in President Robert
Mugabe's government, said reports that the authorities
were backtracking on
the land reform programme, launched to international
criticism in 2000, were
wrong
"They are lying. I have
never spoken to any foreign journalist
and all their claims are wrong,"
Mutasa was quoted as saying.
There has been confusion over
claims the authorities, worried by
the downturn in agricultural production,
might be considering inviting back
white farmers. Several press reports have
said that
white farmers are applying for leases to rent back
their land
from the state.
Mutasa said that white farmers
still on their land were being
told to apply for leases because in some
cases the government wanted to cut
down their farm sizes.
"If the state considers that the farm is too big then it is
going to be
reduced ... That is what is happening," he said.
About 4 000
white commercial farmers used to own most of
Zimbabwe's most fertile land
before 1999. Now most have been replaced by new
black farmers and there are
only a few hundred white farmers left on the
land.
"We
hope that these white farmers will refrain from doing
agriculture in a
political way; they must just be farmers and resist from
politics on the
land," Mutasa told the Independent.
White farmers stoked the
ire of Mugabe because in many cases
they were believed to be supporters of
the main opposition Movement for
Democratic Change. -- Sapa-dpa
zimbabwejournalists.com
By a Correspondent
THE BRITISH
government is encouraging the African Union to push the
Zimbabwean
government to respond to allegations of massive human rights
abuses that
were labelled against it by the African Commission on Human and
People's
Rights.
Responding to questions in the House of Lords, the
Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, Lord
Triesman, said Britain and its allies welcomed the African
commission's
report. The stinging report criticises Zimbabwe's human rights
record. It
tabulates a number of human rights abuses by the government of
Zimbabwe,
which was given three months to respond by the AU but is yet to do
so even
long after the deadline. Some of the cases included in the report
include
the merciless torture of human rights lawyer Gabriel Shumba,
opposition
Member of Parliament, Job Sikhala and other opposition activists.
The House
of Lords talked about the Commission's report and other related
issues
yesterday.
"It is a clear indictment of Mugabe's policies.
It also shows the
growing willingness of Africans to speak out over the
situation in
Zimbabwe," Lord Triesman told the House. "The African Union,
at its last
summit in January, gave Zimbabwe three months to respond to the
commission's
report. That deadline has now passed, and we do not believe
that the
Government of Zimbabwe have done so. We are encouraging the African
Union to
pursue the issue firmly."
Lord Blaker said the African
Union was doing a useful job militarily
in Sudan, but was falling down on
human rights, good governance and the rule
of law. "Is it not perhaps time
for those who wish success to the African
Union to remind its leaders that
the demise of the Organisation of African
Unity with a less than
satisfactory reputation was largely due to failure on
those fronts?," he
asked Lord Triesman who responded:
"With regard to the noble Lord's
question, I believe that the African
Union plainly could do more. The point
is well taken, and it is an argument
that we make. Other African leaders
share that concern. There is
frustration, which is plain in the statements
made by President Obasanjo
and, I am pleased to say, more recently by
President Mbeki. Bad governance
lies behind the (Zimbabwe) crisis. If the
African Union is not to repeat the
mistakes of the past, it must deal with
that as one of its undertakings.
Indeed, that was part of the arrangements
made at Gleneagles-it is part of
what I regard as an African
bargain."
Lord Acton asked whether the British government has been
speaking with
the South African government on the Commission's report and
wanted to know
what its current policy towards Zimbabwe was.
"My
Lords, we have certainly been in touch with the South African
Government,
although not on the specifics of the report. We have been in
touch with them
on the specifics of the IMF reports, the Tibaijuka report
and other reports.
There is profound disquiet-as, indeed, there should
be-about events in
Zimbabwe," said Lord Triesman. "There is a fear that, in
the economic
meltdown that is happening before our eyes in Zimbabwe, there
is a real risk
of many millions of people being displaced across the Limpopo
into a very
poor area of South Africa, creating probably unprecedented
humanitarian and
security issues for that country. South Africa is very
concerned about that,
and we need it to put still more pressure on Zimbabwe
to prevent
it."
Another member, Lord Chidgey, asked whether, given the welcome
indications that the African Union was taking an interest in the internal
affairs of its member states, the British government could further
pressurise the AU to press Zimbabwe even more strongly to respond to the
African commission's report, particularly given that the massive flow of
refugees out of Zimbabwe into neighbouring countries is causing equally
massive instability in those areas.
"I agree with the noble Lord.
There is every reason for the African
Union to insist that the time that it
allowed for a response has elapsed and
that a response is now due. The
international community is owed no less,"
Lord Triesman said
Also
discussed was Zimbabwe's desire to join the Human Rights
Commission. The
southern African country has since announced it is pulling
out of the UN
body to allow another country from the region to fill the
seat.
Lord Alton of Liverpool asked the Minister to expand on remarks of the
former Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, last week that he hoped that China
would play a role in helping resolve problems in countries such as Zimbabwe,
Sudan and Burma. "There has not as yet been a significant or public
response, but it must be the case that a country that is as influential as
China is in the economic affairs of many continents-not just in Africa-must
assume the full responsibilities that come with being a giant player in
world politics. We are urging that on the Chinese. The first indications
that they wish to have a dialogue on, for example, Africa as a whole is an
encouraging start. Everybody who has dealt with China knows that these
things do not happen overnight," the Minister said.
The House also
went on to talk about NEPAD, the crisis in Darfur and
related issues. Lord
Triemsan said NePAD had made significant strides
towards its goals. "The
peer group reviews in some African countries are
beginning to show the
benefits. It is worth saying that, overall, Africa is
moving forward with
more democracy and more open and representative
democratic institutions,
but, of course, it is legitimate for Members of
your Lordships' House to
identify areas in which the problems are acute and
where they must be
resolved."
Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
Date: 05 May
2006
In May 2005, the Zimbabwean government initiated an
extraordinary campaign
of forced evictions and demolitions resulting in the
internal displacement
of an estimated 570,000 people, many of whom remain in
transit camps and
have limited access to assistance. The campaign, known as
Operation
Murambatsivina, or Operation Restore Order, targeted informal
settlements
and business structures in urban areas throughout the country.
Providing
little if any notice of impending evictions, Operation
Murambatsvina was
characterised by extreme violence and brutality - twenty
thousand vendors
were reportedly arrested, and through bulldozing, smashing
and burning,
homes were first destroyed in shanty towns in high-density
suburbs and
subsequently the operation was extended to settlements on farms
in
peri-urban and rural areas. More than 52 sites across Zimbabwe were
affected
by the operation. The motivations behind the devastating operation
remains
unclear - while the government maintains the operation intended to
'clean up'
urban areas, a number of other explanations have surfaced,
including that
the operation was aimed as retribution against those who
voted for the
opposition, or that it was initiated over general concern over
chaos and
congestion in the cities or to deter a popular uprising and force
people to
move to rural areas. Whatever the reasoning, the operation in
itself
violated the fundamental human rights of those affected and exposed
those
displaced to further abuses. While the operation targeted supposed
illegal
structures, many of those displaced held valid legal title to their
homes or
businesses.
The Zimbabwean government continues to
deliberately obstruct humanitarian
agencies working in the country and
continues to threaten urban dwellers and
entrepreneurs with renewed
evictions. Zimbabwe is characterised as a complex
humanitarian situation;
24.6 per cent of Zimbabweans are estimated to be
infected with HIV and there
are 1.3 million orphans. Set against the
backdrop of economic collapse, with
an unemployment rate of 80 per cent, a
political crisis, a failed land
reform process that had already caused
large-scale displacement, and an
acute housing shortage, Operation
Murambatsvina only served to exacerbate
the vulnerability of the Zimbabwean
population. The UN estimates that 2.4
million people, equalling 18 per cent
of the population, were directly or
indirectly affected by the operation.
While many top UN officials and
western governments condemned the operation,
the silence from African
leaders and governments and African regional
organisations such as the
African Union, continues to be a major impediment
to a genuine recognition
by the Zimbabwean government of the severity of the
situation and the
humanitarian needs.
Brian Raftopoulos …………
Non-Party Political Actors
in Zimbabwe
…………
Non-Party Political
Engagement with State
Authoritarianism: 1980 - 2005 …………
Strengths and Limitations of
Non-Party Political
Responses
to State Authoritarianism
…………
Future Challenges and
Strategies for Non-Party
Political
Actors
…………
References
…………
The Institute has for the past three years worked extensively in Zimbabwe in cooperation with analysts, activists, church leaders, women’s organizations and umbrella groups. Our objective is to build democracy in a society where civil and political liberties are progressively undermined by government, while those democratic gains that have been made over the past few years are being negated. This suggests the need to constantly rethink and develop new strategies in the struggle for democracy.
In 2004, the Institute’s developed a close working relationship with a group of Zimbabwean academics and activists. The initial interaction and discussions were characterised by a candid exchange of views prompting, inter alia, suggestions that this group be regularly convened as a think tank under the leadership of Brian Raftopoulos. The think tank has had a growing impact, both as a unit and through its individual members, in the shaping of perceptions on Zimbabwe in partner organisations, the media and elsewhere. The insights and analyses that emanated from the group have been channelled into a series of publications on the continuing crisis in the country.
The first publication,
Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation (Raftopoulos and Savage,
eds.) was published by the Institute in 2004 and Weaver Press in Zimbabwe in
2005. The book addressed a range of issues integral to the development of
reconciliation as a political and practical instrument of transition in
Zimbabwe. The unique value of the book was that it provided a platform for
Zimbabwean voices. This in turn, it is hoped, will serve both to inform external
players and to create space for democratic discussions within Zimbabwe on ways
of taking the nation forward.
The second publication, The Struggle for Legitimacy: A Long-Term Analysis of the 2005 Parliamentary Election and its Implications for Democratic Processes in Zimbabwe, included analyses of certain key areas in relation to the political situation in Zimbabwe, namely the media, the role of the military and the gendered implications of the election process.
The close of 2005 then saw
the think tank working towards the publication of a text examining ‘lessons
learned’ and the future of democratic politics in Zimbabwe. The report, The Future of Democratic Politics in Zimbabwe,
contains chapters that focus on what has happened since 2000 in a variety of
sectors within the country. In looking
at each area, the members of the think-tank were guided by three basic
questions:
The
aim was to establish the situation now, before looking at ideal scenarios for
each sector’s operation within a democratic dispensation and strategic options
for moving the current situation towards
resolution.
This publication, Reflections on Democratic Politics in Zimbabwe,
is the fourth in the series. It is built from the analyses contained in the
report on the future of democratic politics but provides a synthesis of the
central issues alongside a detailed study of the main opposition party, the
Movement for Democratic Change. Our hope
is that, through wide distribution of this accessible text, we can contribute to
the continuing debate on the way forward for
Zimbabwe.
In
its creation of ideal-types – the ideal citizen, the ‘true’ Zimbabwean, the
‘enemy’ that is the West – the Zimbabwean state’s authoritarianism attempts to
eliminate imagination and in so doing, empathy.
It has triumphed when citizens and groups can no longer remember or
imagine alternative dispensations. This report is testimony to the fact that
Zimbabweans, despite the devastating impact of the state’s authoritarian hand,
continue to seek out alternatives. In so
doing, the authors illustrate a commitment to the knowledge that "freedom itself is never the end of the
road - only the beginning" (Ignatieff, 1994: 107).
Building opposition politics on the African continent has proven
immensely difficult largely because of the oppressive nature of most
post-colonial states and the extremely difficult structural conditions under
which opposition forces have to mobilise and reproduce their support. In
countries that have undergone an extensive liberation struggle, such as Zimbabwe
in Southern Africa, the development of opposition politics presents specific
challenges. In particular, the strong legacy of legitimacy enjoyed by former
liberation movements and their capacity for revived nationalist mobilisation
have presented opposition forces with immense obstacles in developing
alternative programmatic positions. Moreover, the often-repressive nature of
post-colonial states, compounding the longer repressive histories of colonial
politics, has presented democratic forces with few precursors of alternative
democratic forms. These obstacles must be set within the context of a global
political environment that presents strong structural limits on the positioning
of post neo-liberal alternatives. It is therefore not surprising that civic and
opposition forces on the continent generally and in Southern Africa in
particular have struggled to locate themselves firmly within the historical
legacies and contemporary demands of their particular national
contexts.
The
Zimbabwean crisis has brought these problems into sharp focus largely because
the crisis of the state and the economy has magnified these issues on a grand
scale. Confronted with a strong former liberation movement, led by a leader with
enormous prestige on the continent, civic and opposition forces have had to face
the combined obstacles of an authoritarian nationalist state constructed through
the legitimacy of the liberation struggle, in a rapidly shrinking economy that
has comprehensively undermined the structural basis for the reproduction of
broad social forces in the country. Moreover, in the short term, this scenario
has not engendered a spirit of reform in the ruling party. Instead observers
have witnessed the intensification of repressive rule and the continued
marginalisation of opposition forces, with the military taking on an
increasingly prominent role in all spheres of the state. Additionally, the
growing repression of the state is centrally linked to the intense succession
battle currently unfolding in Zimbabwe’s ruling party, as the latter seeks to
look at its future beyond its president, Robert Mugabe. This predicament has
resulted in a more general malaise in the state where policy issues have become
captive to internal struggles within ZANU PF. As Eldred Masunungure has
written:
The
succession struggle is all consuming and here lies ZANU PF’s single weakness at
this juncture. Virtually everything in ZANU PF and Government is being
interpreted in presidential succession terms. The policy dissonance arising from
this debilitating struggle has become a big threat not only to ZANU PF but to
the nation as a whole (2006: 5).
As
the country slips deeper into economic crisis and international isolation, the
opposition forces have to develop new non-violent ways to confront the regime.
Thus far, as this report shows, the civic and opposition forces have tried a
range of strategies to oppose Zimbabwe’s ruling party. These have included
strikes, stay-aways, demonstrations, public meetings, regional and international
lobbying, the use of both national and international legal instruments, censure
from various international bodies, limited international sanctions, and pressure
from the Zimbabwean Diaspora. These measures have, in different ways, caused
problems for the regime, but neither singularly nor collectively have they been
able to bring about political reform.
The
continuing, though faltering capacity, of the Zimbabwean state to wield the
instruments of coercion against opposition forces, and the central location of
ruling party support within the armed forces and intelligence services, has led
to a growing reliance of the Zimbabwean state on force for political survival.
This process has engendered both fear and despondency within the Zimbabwean
populace, and presented the democratic forces within the country with perilous
terrain on which to mobilise support. As the independent media, labour unions,
constitutional movement, women’s movement, civic alliances, human rights
organisations and churches have struggled to place democratic and human rights
questions on the political agenda through peaceful means, the state has
systematically closed down these spaces and asserted its right to exclusive
control of the political agenda.
Notwithstanding the many setbacks that the democratic forces in Zimbabwe
have experienced, the post-colonial civic movement in the country has had a
remarkable history. Emerging as it did from under the wing of a dominant
nationalist party, and for the first decade largely subsuming its activities to
a complementary role, the civic forces developed, from the late 1980’s and in
particularly in the 1990’s, into an autonomous and critical force, demanding the
expansion of democratic spaces and greater state accountability. Moreover this
movement introduced a more expansive and inclusive language of human and civic
rights into the national political discourse - a language that had been
marginalised in the dominant discursive practices of nationalist politics. These
civic interventions have been critical to the process of expanding the political
imaginaries of Zimbabwean politics, and notwithstanding the current setback in
the civic and opposition movement, have introduced a framework of accountability
that will not be easy for the state to erase and which will serve as an
important resource for the revival of democratic politics in the
country.
One
of the major lessons learned in studying the development of democratic politics
in Zimbabwe, is that alternative movements are necessarily built within
particular national contexts and often these movements reproduce and assimilate
aspects of the undemocratic cultures they are attempting to challenge and
transform. As the paper on the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) shows this
process has been all too apparent in the crisis that has debilitated this
movement. Problems of accountability, violence and organisation have led to an
uncomfortable similarity between the politics of the opposition and that of the
ruling party. Part of the explanation
for this disturbing trend has been that the repressive conditions under which
the opposition has had to operate have necessitated a certain measure of
commandism in opposition structures.
There is certainly some truth in this assertion. The crisis of responding
at every turn to various forms of state harassment has proscribed the
opportunities for more open forms of popular involvement. However, what is also
apparent is that the political opposition has not expended sufficient
organisational and intellectual resources to the development of alternative
political modes of organisation and participation. The central focus on the
capture of state power has diverted energies away from developing democratic
forms of mobilisation, organisation and participation. Moreover the mode and
language of expressing political differences have readily drawn on the political
culture of the ruling party. These developments have been a major setback for
the democratic struggle in Zimbabwe and will need to be more consciously
addressed in repairing the damage resulting from the recent debacle in the
MDC.
REFLECTIONS ON
OPPOSITION POLITICS IN ZIMBABWE: THE POLITICS OF THE
MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC
CHANGE
Brian Raftopoulos,
Programme Manager,
Transitional Justice in Africa, Institute for Justice and
Reconciliation
The dramatic schism and
implosion in the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), Zimbabwe’s main
opposition party, in 2005/2006, has once again raised major questions about the
future of opposition politics not only at a national level, but also on the
continent. The MDC represented the hope of millions of Zimbabweans searching for
a way out of the deep political and economic crisis that characterises
contemporary Zimbabwe. For a short period the party pointed to the possibilities
of creating an alternative, democratic non-violent, post-colonial politics,
while confronting the enormous legacy and legitimacy of a former liberation
movement and its enigmatic leader.
Founded on the basis of a
strong civic movement, enunciating the need for both political and economic
reforms, the MDC captured the growing disgruntlement of Zimbabwe’s citizens over
eroding economic conditions and the political arrogance of the ruling party. The
energy of a younger generation of civic activists, no longer paralysed by the
fear of confronting the ‘party of liberation’ and the ideological baggage that
accompanied it, brought a vibrant energy into Zimbabwean politics, and expanded
the subjunctive mood of the post-colonial milieu. The combination of the
politics of constitutional reform and trade union activism provided a national
organisational reach and an expansive discursive opportunity that radically
challenged the increasingly moribund exclusivity of ZANU PF’s nationalism. The
politics of possibility dominated the discussions of thousands of activists
around the country, and the sense of imminent victory, often of Panglossian
dimensions, was everywhere apparent. The huge weight of a political monolith
appeared to be lifting, and opportunities to pose new questions not only about
the present and future, but also about the legacies of the past, began to
appear.
For some analysts the
emergence of this opposition was merely an ‘anti-Mugabe reaction’, a counter to
the glaring shortcomings of the ruling party. In short, it represented no
positive alternatives. One response to this accusation is that all opposition
movements begin in such ways. However, the MDC also generated the release of new
energies and possibilities and the construction of a novel democratic discourse
in the Zimbabwean context. The ruling party and its intellectuals have been
loath to admit this, because in the discursive world of Zimbabwe’s liberation
politics the politics of freedom can only emanate from the former liberation
movement. This form of ideological closure has been a central part of the
authoritarian politics that has marked the most recent period of Zimbabwe’s
politics (Hammar, Raftopoulos and Jense, 2003; Raftopoulos and Savage, 2004;
Ranger, 2004). Despite the repressive response of the state to these challenges
such questions continue to be asked.
Notwithstanding the
possibilities and hopes that the emergence of the MDC created, the opposition
has also been marked by very serious shortcomings that have reflected, both the
ways in which dissenting politics often take on aspects of the political culture
they seek to displace, and the organisational and imaginative limits of the MDC
challenge. These are the issues that this paper will attempt to explore, as well
as to point to some of the challenges that are likely to confront any future
opposition initiative in Zimbabwe. However, before tackling these central
concerns the paper will first provide a brief historical context to the
emergence of the MDC.
HISTORICAL TRENDS IN
NATIONALIST AND OPPOSITION POLITICS
Several studies of African
opposition politics in Zimbabwe during both the colonial and post-colonial
periods stress the importance of a triple legacy in undermining the growth of a
democratic tradition. This legacy includes the influence of ‘traditional’,
subject politics (Mamdani, 1996), the authoritarian structures of colonial rule
and the commandist politics of the liberation struggle with its attendant view
that only liberation parties can represent the ‘will of the people’ for the
foreseeable future (Sithole, 1997; Moyo, 1993; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2004;
Masunungure, 2004). Thus, while nationalism provided a contingent discursive
unity, usually marked by tensions and cleavages, this mobilisational force also
carried with it a series of unpropitious tendencies undermining future
democratic politics.
During the colonial period
nationalist politics was often characterised by violent ruptures both between
and within nationalist parties. The 1963 split between Zapu and its splinter
organisation Zanu, was marked by a series of violent clashes and mutual
demonisation that continued until the formation of the Patriotic Front on the
eve of the 1979 Lancaster House Conference. The rivalry between the two parties
continued in the aftermath of the post-1980 settlement, punctuated by the
Gukurahundi violence of the new state in Matabeleland and the Midlands in the
mid-1980’s. This massive deployment of state violence effectively led to the
formal subsumption of PF Zapu to the ruling ZANU PF in the form of the 1987
Unity Accord, and thus the demise of a formidable opposition party. Within the
nationalist parties themselves, a number of violent power struggles occurred in
both Zanu and Zapu in the 1970’s that consolidated the leadership of the ‘old
guard’ (Moore, 1991), setting the precedent for the violent marginalisation of
dissenting voices within nationalist politics.[1]
Ndlovu- Gatsheni describes
the effects of these legacies on post-colonial politics as
follows:
The new Zimbabwean state
under ZANU PF failed miserably to make a break with the tradition of nationalist
authoritarianism and guerrilla violence as well as colonial settler oppression.
The ruling party itself failed to de-militarise itself as a militarised
liberation movement, not only in practice, but also in attitude and style of
management of civil institutions and the state at large. The new ZANU PF
government readily assumed the resilient colonial and equally military oriented
structures left by the retreating settler state, with serious implications for
democracy, human rights and human security (2004).
For most of the 1980’s the
political milieu was characterised by a combination of repression, in particular
the brutal state response to opposition in Matabeleland, and a general deference
to the authority and liberation legitimacy of the new state. Most emergent civic
bodies and NGOs regarded their activities as complementing the developmental
programmes of ZANU PF, and the state could draw on a considerable amount of
ideological capital because of its liberation history (Rich Dorman, 2001). By
1987 the ruling party had disposed of two opposition groups, the first, in 1986,
by constitutionally removing the entrenched white seats in parliament agreed to
at the Lancaster House Constitution, and the second through the brutal
Gukurahundi campaign against Zapu in the mid 1980’s and the pursuant 1987 Unity
Accord between the two major nationalist parties which effectively incapacitated
Zapu. Through these measures, the introduction of an executive president in 1987
with immense power, and ready access to the repressive legacies of the settler
state, the outlook for opposition politics appeared dismal (Moyo, 1992).
However the combination of a
contracting economy, the erosion of state legitimacy through the exposure of
corruption in the ruling party, and the emergence of critical social forces such
as the labour movement, the student movement, along with critical intellectual
and media responses, led to the emergence of another opposition party in 1989.
Led by former ZANU PF stalwart, Edgar Tekere, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM)
fought the ruling party’s attempts to impose a one-party state in Zimbabwe, and
performed favourably in the 1990 Presidential election. Though the party did not
survive for long in the 1990’s, and was largely confined in terms of its support
base to a small urban and student base, particularly in Tekere’s home area in
Mutare, ZUM both fractured the seeming unity of ZANU PF and fought for the
necessity of multi party politics.
The various attempts at
opposition that followed in the 1990’s, such as the Zanu Ndonga, the Democratic
Party, the Forum Party and the Zimbabwe Union of Democrats, were largely
unsuccessful in constructing national constituencies and in providing popular
alternatives to ZANU PF. Moreover in the face of determined state repression and
an electoral system that provided little space for them to score electoral
victories, these parties, with limited capacity to develop viable structures,
remained little more than political amusement for the ruling party (Makumbe and
Compagnon, 2000). In sum by the mid 1990’s opposition politics were largely
built around individuals, prone to fractious outbreaks, and unable to develop
both a popular message and a national reach. As Masunungure notes, these parties
‘appeared to be more aggressive in attacking each other than in directing their
firepower at ZANU PF’ (Masunungure, 2004: 165).
By the latter half of the
1990’s the fortunes of opposition politics took a different turn. The most
formidable opposition party of the post-colonial period emerged into an
apparently barren field of dissent. In 1999 the Movement for Democratic Change
(MDC) was born, the product of a combination of labour struggles, constitutional
politics and a generation of human rights struggles, and built on the failures
of previous attempts at opposition politics. The new movement also attracted the
support of the mainly white large scale commercial farming sector. Constructed
in the era of debilitating structural adjustment programmes, the MDC drew on and
fed into a growing wave of political and economic disenchantment, and provided a
message of ‘change’ which found resonance through nationally based structures.
Through the language of political rights, constitutionalism and economic reform,
the MDC and its social partners confronted ZANU PF with its first mass
opposition party, and the threat of imminent defeat (Masunungure, 2004: 165;
Raftopoulos, 2001). Carried on the wave of the constitutional movement’s
referendum victory against a ZANU PF imposed constitution in 2000, and backed by
the threat of popular mobilisation, the MDC gained nearly 50% of the
parliamentary vote in 2000 in the face of enormous electoral obstacles, and
state violence. Moreover as Laakso points out, the organisational base of the
MDC ‘was not merely one of popular discontent with the executive, but an
explicit agenda to democratise the state through a peaceful transition’ (Laakso,
2004: 13).
Since its dynamic ascension
onto the Zimbabwean political stage in the 1990’s the MDC has had to face the
difficult tasks of building accountable party structures, developing policy
positions and peaceful political strategies, and projecting a regional and
international profile, against an authoritarian state that has consistently
closed down the spaces for opposition politics in the country. Moreover the MDC
has had to confront the effects of the country’s authoritarian political
legacies on its attempts to develop an alternative political culture. It is to
the analysis of these issues that we now turn.
THE MDC: CONFRONTING THE
CHALLENGES OF OPPOSITION POLITICS IN AN AUTHORITARIAN
STATE
Soon after its launch in
September 1999 the MDC had to confront a number of organisational and structural
problems. At a strategic meeting in early 2000 the leadership outlined the
following challenges:
· Lack of coordination of policy
committees.
· Lack of coordination between the
President’s Office and the Secretariat.
· Lack of accountability and procedures in
the disbursement of funds.
· Need for clearer procedures in the
appointment and discipline of security officials.
· Insufficient consultation between the
President and the Vice President.
· Lack of coordination between the party
Chairman and other departments.
· The need for more clarity on the
functions of the Deputy Secretary General.[2]
The meeting also noted that
the ‘President’s office should provide leadership for the entire party, while
facilitating the strengthening of particular departments.’[3] In order to deal with these
problems the leadership agreed to rationalise the functions of each position and
improve the communication within the leadership, as well as between the
leadership and the various levels of the party structures. In addition to these
problems, the violent land occupations following the NCA/MDC victory in the
February 2000 constitutional referendum confronted the MDC with three major
strategic problems: the cordoning off of the rural areas by the ruling party;
the elimination of MDC structures and personnel; and the lack of alternative
sources of information in rural areas (MDC Strategy Paper, April
2000). In the face of these challenges the MDC set itself
the following objectives:
· To facilitate the reduction of levels of
political violence and the creation of more peaceful conditions for
electioneering.
· To shift the mode of mobilisation to a
low profile campaign.
· To provide information on the election
process that would increase voter confidence and the assurance of voter
secrecy.
· To raise the profile of the MDC campaign
message on the economy, particularly land, jobs, indigenisation and
investment.
· To re-engage the civic organisations
that provided the bedrock for the formation of the
MDC.
· To isolate President Mugabe within his
own party, at national level and in the regional and international
spheres.
· To pressure the police to carry out
their duties.
· To maintain the international media
focus on the primary goal of the elections, and the monitoring of election
violence.
· To minimise the security threat to the
leadership of the MDC.[4]
A number of issues emerge
from these early assessments. Firstly, the problems of organisation,
responsibility and accountability in party structures that would later take on
such explosive forms were already apparent. Secondly, the party was aware of the
central strategic challenge that confronted it, namely the commitment to a
peaceful, electoral process of change, while understanding the growing
limitations of this approach in the face of the ruling party’s intransigence. As
a strategy update paper noted, while the ‘strongest weapon’ of the MDC was
‘public adherence to the principles of democracy and the rule of law’, the party
‘must not lose sight of the fact that we may be in for a much longer and harder
race than we first envisaged’ (MDC Strategy Update, 8th May 2000).
Thirdly, the MDC, as part of its commitment to peaceful politics, was still
optimistic, many would say naïve, in its belief that it could hope for a certain
minimum level of professionalism from the organs of the state. Fourthly, as the
ruling party was in the initial stages of reorganising its party and state
structures in the face of the MDC threat, the opposition party believed that it
was possible to work on the divisions in ZANU PF and to isolate Mugabe.
Particular attention was paid to the fractious Masvingo province where there
were long and well publicised differences between the ZANU PF provincial strong
man, Edison Zvobgo, and Mugabe. In 2001 it was believed that Zvobgo’s position
could be summed up as, ‘We don’t want Mugabe but we are not MDC’.[5] Lastly, in addition to the
difficulties faced in attempting to develop its media capacity, the MDC was
clearly unsure of how to deal with the problem of rural penetration given the
enormous obstacles presented by the land occupations led by the war veterans and
supported politically and logistically by the ruling party and state machinery.
Some of its suggestions included engaging the support of churches and
approaching traditional leaders, but there was little substance provided for the
proposed strategies (MDC Strategic Paper, April 2000).
Looking at the problem of
structures more closely provides some idea of the organisational problems faced
by the MDC in 2000. At an MDC District Workshop in August 2000, a number of
problems were registered. It was noted that while structures were in place at
district level they were weak at branch level. Conflicts were also reported by
some of the committees over poor time-keeping, lack of protocol and the
influence of alcohol. A request was made for a code of conduct to be passed on
to the Secretary General of the party. There was also a ‘strong feeling’ that
all MPs must communicate with their electorate, ‘even if they have made promises
that they cannot fulfil in the short-term.’ The meeting warned that if the MPs
‘do not become visible any further campaigning will be difficult.’ The members
recommended that in order to strengthen the party there was a need for training
in a number of areas: the procedures for running meetings, minute taking; public
speaking; conflict resolution mechanisms; organisation; budgeting and allocation
of scarce resources; proposal writing; and writing internal memos.[6]
These problems became
apparent during campaign periods, when the Party’s lack of coordination,
strategy and discipline were exposed. A report on the Marondera West
campaign in late 2000 revealed a series of operational problems. Youths and
security were brought into the area and ‘hijacked the campaign as a means to
giving employment’. The Provincial Chair ‘was allowed to use the campaign for
his personal campaign’. In the end, the party spent two million dollars ‘dealing
with youth and security problems and logistics instead of winning votes and
getting voters to the voting stations.’ The report on the campaign concluded
that:
The bulk
of the youth are bad mannered, undisciplined, uncontrollable and only in it for
the money. They left the
premises and vehicles they used in a disgusting state and when asked to clean up
said - ‘I am not the one’. [7]
In a recent, useful study of
political parties in Zimbabwe LeBas has analysed the context in which these
organisational problems developed. She notes that given the changed political
environment from 2000-2003 and the increased ruling party violence that
characterised it, ‘violence drove party activists into the cities, and formal
party structures subsequently collapsed.’ Furthermore she observes that the
‘most immediate response to this problem was a turn from visible party
structures to more amorphous, socially embedded networks’ (LeBas, 2005: 183-4).
Assessing the state of the party in the aftermath of the 2002 Presidential
Election LeBas writes:
In a post-election report, the MDC’s organising department noted that party structures had ‘disintegrated’; further there was ‘very little or no activity’ by provincial structures, due in some cases to misappropriation of funds. Nor could the national executive remain well-informed about conditions outside Harare: an audit in late 2002 found that most provincial leaders were passing along false information about party structures and membership. Members of the national executive pointed to these problems to explain the failure of the planned post-election mass action, saying that it was simply lost in the party structures (Ibid: 186).
This problem of adapting
organisational structures to deal with state violence was not only faced by the
MDC but also by key civic movements such as the NCA many of whose members also
belonged to the MDC. Assessing the ‘mass action’ strategy adopted by the NCA
after 2000, and the violence that was sometimes used by its membership,
McCandless concludes:
In the case of the NCA the research…indicates that the use of violent strategies (even if only by some of their members) undermines their message, which causes disaffection of important NCA constituencies. Moreover, it is ineffectual given their weak position vis-à-vis the violent capacity of the state (2005: 584).
The major
organisational response of the MDC to the repressive political environment was
to create a parallel structure within the party. LeBas describes this as a
‘shadowy party structure, which would be designed to facilitate top-down
organising and speedy response to orders from national leadership’ (LeBas, 2005:
187). The activities of this structure not only resulted in major problems of
accountability and violence within the party structures, but became a central
site of struggle for the control of the party between the President and the
Secretary General.
The first major sign of the
problems that were being caused by this parallel structure was the violence that
occurred at the Party headquarters in 2004, specifically the beating up of party
officials. One of the party officials that was affected by these disturbances,
the Director of Security, testified to an internal Commission of Inquiry that
this structure was formed by two of the Party Presidents’ aides, ‘as part of the
mass action,’ and that over time this structure had ‘become a reliable source of
force or militia for use in party struggles by unscrupulous politicians’. The
official also believed that there was a ‘tribal clique of people from Masvingo’
who were in control of the parallel structure and who, during the period of
Morgan Tsvangirai’s treason trial,
…..strongly believed that the
President would be convicted, leaving a vacuum which in their view must never be
filled by a Ndebele person contrary to the MDC party constitutional provisions.
Their argument was that even if the Vice-President were to take over, the fact
that he stays in Bulawayo, the effective job of President would fall into the
hands of Prof. Welshman Ncube. This imagination frightened them because for a
long time they have been working on a programme to eliminate the Secretary
General and those deemed as his surrogates.[8]
Others who gave evidence to
this commission accused the Secretary General Welshman Ncube, of wanting to
sabotage the project of removing Mugabe, and claimed that Ncube had a secret
agenda to divide the party’.[9] The report also implied that
there were conflicts between the ‘professionals’ in the Secretary General’s
department and the ‘quasi-professionals’ in the President’s office who believed
that the Secretary General was ‘insubordinate to the President and is working to
launch a new party’.[10] Among the major findings of
the report was the view that there is a ‘strong anti-Ndebele
sentiment that has been propagated, orchestrated and instilled into the innocent
party members’ minds by a senior party leader under the guise of sheer hatred
for the Secretary General at a personal level.’[11] One of the recommendations
made by the commission was that:
An investigation into the
plot by high-ranking officials around the President’s treason trial and the
build-up to congress be put in place without delay with a view to establishing
the extent to which ethnic hatred and division has damaged the party. Throughout
this inquiry direct reference was made to senior leaders being involved in the
promotion of tribalism. It is this commission’s conviction that those leaders
mentioned must be given the opportunity to respond to such disturbing
allegations and appropriate action taken without fear or favour.’[12]
The findings of this
Commission were not made official within the party as the commissioners failed
to agree on the final report. The factionalism that emerged in the party was
reproduced on the Commission and effectively debilitated the finalisation of the
report. Notwithstanding the draft nature of the report it did reveal the
emergence of very serious cleavages in the party, around the President, Morgan
Tsvangirai and the Secretary General, Welshman Ncube. Moreover these differences
were being fed and exacerbated by the parallel structures within the party and
constructed in both ethnic and at times ‘anti-intellectual’
terms.
In May 2005 new outbreaks of
party violence took place at the Party Headquarters in Harare, the Bulawayo
Provincial Office and in Gwanda, and another Commission was set up composed of
the Management Committee. The new Commission noted that the 2004 Commission had
‘failed to reach a consensus and therefore no punishment had been meted out to
the offenders.’ As a result most of the youths who led the disturbances from
12-17 May 2005, had previously, by their own admission, been responsible for the
assault on the Director of Security in 2004. Once again aides in the
President’s office were accused of directing the activities of the youth, and
the objective of the violence was alleged to relate to the political battles
leading up to the forthcoming national party congress. The allegations of
the youth were that the ‘Secretary General, the Deputy Secretary General, and
members of staff were working to replace the President.’[13]
An
important point made in the report was the danger of party functionaries
mobilising unemployed youth to carry out party violence. It was further admitted that the party ‘has no
capacity to satisfy youth welfare needs’ and that there is a ‘general lack of
education and orientation on party objectives and values.’[14] This point needs
to be situated within the broader context of the culture of violence established
and perpetuated by ZANU PF. The central findings of the report
were:
· It is common cause that the greater
majority of our youths in our structures are activists and
unemployed.
· They have no source of income, therefore
they are destitute. This makes them vulnerable to political vultures who are
cash driven.
· Staff, some party leaders and the
external forces are using the youths for various political ambitions and devious
goals.
· The party goal and values for which the
MDC was founded have been abandoned in pursuit of narrow selfish,
self-satisfying ambitions and greed.
· The congress agenda has hijacked the
party focus.
· The issue of ethnic affinity is also
being abused in the party to form divergent
groupings.
· The notion that there are some who are
more equal than others and falsely believe they are the only founders of the
party, is a divisive issue.
· Competing interests of politicians are a
threat to the very existence of the party.[15]
As with the 2004 report there
was little action taken on the issues raised, apart from the expulsion of
several youth believed to have been responsible for the violence. There was no attempt to hold
to account the senior party figures alleged to be the ‘handlers’ of these
youth. The party’s legal spokesperson David Coltart complained about this
failure in the report. In a statement to the National Executive of the party
Coltart noted:
I cannot believe that the
youths involved in these despicable acts acted independently. It is common cause
that they were unemployed and it is equally clear that they had access to
substantial funding. That money must have come from people with access to
resources. The instructions to act must have come from people within the Party
as no-one else would have the detailed knowledge the youths had access to. In
expelling the youths and relatively low ranking members of the security team we
have only dealt with the symptoms of the problem, not its root cause.[16]
Coltart also charged that it
was ‘abundantly clear…that the Management Committee either did not manage to
find out who instigated these acts of violence or it chose not to reveal those
responsible’, and that whatever the case ‘there has been an inadequate
investigation into who was behind the violence.’ Coltart then stated his
explanation for the compromised nature of the
report:
It is common cause that the
principle reason behind the violence was an alleged power struggle within the
Management Committee. For that reason alone the Management Committee should not
have conducted the investigation. They were in fact judges in their own
cause.[17]
Finally Coltart attempted to
reassure Tsavangirai that his Secretary General, Welshman Ncube, had no ambition
to replace him as President.
Within the MDC only Morgan
Tsvangirai has sufficient stature to contest the presidency. Welshman Ncube
knows that; I know that. Those within the party who seriously suggest that
Morgan Tsvangirai’s presidency is under threat are either being deliberately
mischievous or simply do not understand basic political reality within
Zimbabwe.[18]
Discussions on these problems
continued amongst the leadership at a management committee retreat in July 2005.
Once again the issue of the parallel structure was raised and the allegation was
made that a ‘kitchen cabinet’, made up of Presidential aides, had formed around
the President and undermined the decisions of the elected
leadership:
Members of the Management
Committee explained that they felt decisions that were taken by the team were
changed after the President consulted with members of his staff, or that staff
counteracted their decisions, or took decisions that were beyond their ‘brief’
or job descriptions.[19]
It is important to note that
these allegations were made by four of the six members of the Management
Committee, namely the Vice President Gibson Sibanda, the Secretary General
Welshman Ncube, the Deputy Secretary General Gift Chimanikire and the National
Treasurer Fletcher Dulini. Tsvangirai disagreed saying
that these concerns over the ‘kitchen cabinet’ ‘were unsubstantiated…..due to
rumour and miscommunication.’[20] The Chair of the party Isaac
Matongo, after some equivocation, lined up behind his President. Thus the
division within the leadership appeared to be, and was constructed as, an ethnic
divide with Tsvangirai’s critics, except for Chimanikire, coming from
Matabeleland.
At the July retreat the
leadership were also fully aware that the party was losing political ground, and
that ‘deep concerns about the MDC’s ability to lead itself, let alone compete
effectively against the ruling party exist and are growing monthly.’ The
leadership then agreed on the need to devise a programme of activities that
would ‘demonstrate unity, build relationships amongst members of civil society,
and create PR opportunities which contradict the consistent negative image of a
fractured party.’[21] The Management Committee also
noted the central need to focus on the defeat of ZANU PF, because in the absence
of this,
…members are worrying about
consolidating existing positions, and any future positions that maintain
prestige or financial income. Although the situation internally is precarious,
members can still derive status and income from positions within the MDC. The
focus of maintaining these positions is distracting from commitment to the
political struggle.[22]
While the MDC leadership had
to deal with a growing factional struggle, it also had to continue to contend
with the strategic difficulties of confronting the Mugabe regime. In the run up
to the 2005 general election the leadership resolved that the election message
had to change:
The debate on participation
has revolved around the issues of governance. However, experience had shown that
elections are won by focussing on bread and butter issues hence jobs and food
had been put at the forefront of issues to be addressed by the Party. The
immediate challenge was in essence to send the right message to the people that
the MDC not only focuses on human rights and intellectual liberties but day to
day issues.[23]
Moreover, given the
limitations of electoral participation as a political strategy in the repressive
political climate, the party needed to ‘strike a balance between voter
expectations and the real situation on the ground’ Messages had to be
communicated which did not create a ‘crisis of expectations’ and people had to
be ‘psyched up for a bruising fight.’[24] These statements represented
the tension at the heart of the MDC strategic dilemma: a commitment to
participate in elections, while recognising the limitations of this option, and
preparing its support base for the limits of electoral politics while preparing
for an alternative strategy based on mass action. However, the problem has been
that as MDC supporters have grown increasingly disillusioned with electoral
politics, the party has been unable to develop a sustainable strategy for mass
action. This problem has also been true of its civic partners such as the
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the National Constitutional
Assembly (NCA).
In April 2005, soon after the
MDC defeat in the general election Morgan Tsvangirai and his Deputy Secretary
General, Gift Chimanikire met with leaders from the NCA, the ZCTU and the Crisis
in Zimbabwe Coalition to discuss the way forward after another electoral defeat.
The NCA in particular argued at the meeting that the MDC should not take up its
seats in parliament, but instead concentrate on extra-parliamentary struggles,
and stop sending confused signals to its support base. The MDC leadership
pointed out that there was a strong lobby within the MDC advocating the
importance of ‘occupying the democratic space in Parliament’, notwithstanding
the limitations of the electoral process. While the MDC was still unsure of how
to proceed, it was also clear that the civic groups had no clear alternative
strategy beyond the broad call for mass action.[25]
In addition to these
strategic and organisational challenges, the MDC has faced the problem of
developing an inclusive, non-tribal and non-racial post-nationalist ideology,
which was not a vulgar neo-liberalism. This has proved an exceedingly difficult
challenge with the hazards of tribalism, as noted above, already apparent in the
factional struggles within the party. The problem of developing a non-racial
party has also proved extremely challenging. The ‘white face’ of the MDC has
been heavily exploited by ZANU PF in a country and region where the memories of
settler colonial rule are still fresh. This factor has also been an impediment
in the mobilisation and media strategies of the MDC. In a post by-election
campaign report in 2000, one party secretary made the following observation on
the role of white members in MDC campaigns:
They must not involve
themselves physically on the ground as has been the case. They should occupy the
back seats so that Zanu (PF) does not see them. Zanu (PF) captures seats because
it tells the people that the MDC is for the whitemen. Through ignorance the
people believe and they vote Zanu (PF) in.[26]
While this problem was
certainly not the same in all areas of the country, it is safe to say that it
represented a general challenge for the MDC. White political participation in
the politics of independent Zimbabwe was for most of this period marked by the
racist legacy of settler politics, and the unofficial pact of the ruling party’s
Reconciliation Policy. This provided for whites to continue playing a key role
in the economy, while having to vacate the political sphere, aside from
participation through their various economic lobbying groups. The emergence of
the constitutional movement and the MDC, and the major challenge these
represented to the ruling party, provided new spaces for the involvement of
whites in the political arena. The land occupations and their direct threat to
private property rights certainly provided a strong impetus for involvement.
However, the inclusive language of the opposition, which appeared in stark
contrast to the exclusive racialised discourse of ZANU PF, also provided an
invitation to non-racial politics. The following extract is an example of how
one individual responded:
The advent of the No Vote was
a watershed in the history of Zimbabwe. ZANU PF and its agents pitched a massive
Vote Yes campaign along racial lines with prominent newspaper advertisements
like a photograph of two elderly whites with the question “Are you going to
allow them to continue to tell you what to do?” The people, the overwhelming
majority of them blacks, rejected this propaganda, and in doing so showed just
how politically mature they have become, but most importantly to me, sent out a
clear signal that racism is not the burning issue that ZANU PF wants it to be.
Being part of the white minority which is constantly used as a punch bag by the
President when things go wrong, and with it the ill feeling, the No Vote came as
an emotional triumph.[27]
This euphoric embrace of the
politics of the opposition demonstrated both a lack of historical perspective on
the continuing resonance of race in a post settler society and the sense of
victim-hood that had begun to mark the narratives of white discourse after 2000,
in particular. Harris describes this aspect of white narratives in Zimbabwe as
follows:
Mugabe’s revocation of the discourses of reconciliation has allowed for a white re-imagining of the past that…..exculpates white Zimbabwean involvement in racial tensions through dehistoricising that white identity (2005: 107).
Dealing with the weight of such racial legacies in the MDC structures has been immensely difficult. While the MDC has been the party most committed to non-racialism in Zimbabwean politics, the deepening crisis within the party h